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Abstract 
The National Nuclear Energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN) has promoted the culture and assessment of 
nuclear security in Indonesia since 2010. After conducting a successful trial assessment in 2012, BATAN 
performed a second self-assessment in 2015 in three nuclear facilities. The assessment's methodology 
followed the guidelines set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The objective of this 
paper is to demonstrate the techniques used in applying the IAEA methodology and to discuss the 
primary outcomes of the assessment. The data collection consisted of surveys, interviews, document 
reviews, and observations. A total of about 50% of the three facilities’ employees participated in the 
survey and/or interview process. Three categories of sub-cultures—security personnel, non-structural 
personnel, and structural personnel—were assessed, covering a range of twelve general characteristics 
and thirty indicators of security culture. An overall average score of 5.25 on a 7-point scale was obtained 
from the survey. A consolidated assessment of the results from all data collection techniques showed that 
most of the security culture characteristics assessed reflected some of the anticipated best practices and 
also demonstrated strengths necessary in security culture. However, certain aspects of leadership behavior 
need to be enhanced, especially ones relating to motivation. By examining the survey results from the 
1
Antariksawan et al.: Conducting Nuclear Security Culture Self-Assessments in Nuclear Research Facilities Using the IAEA Methodology
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2018 
three subcultures, we conclude that further dissemination of nuclear security concepts and policy is 
needed—particularly to researchers and administrative personnel. The methodology for the IAEA’s 
nuclear security culture self-assessment has been successfully implemented and has resulted in positive 
outcomes. The potential improvement of assessment implementation should also be considered, such as in 
the development of survey questions and the selection of indicators to be elaborated on interviews. 
 
Keywords: security culture, self-assessment, IAEA methodology 
I. Introduction 
Nuclear and radioactive materials should always be kept safe and secure in order to protect employees, 
the public, and the environment from undue exposure to radiation. Potential threats from theft, sabotage, 
unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material must be 
considered when designing an effective security system. One important element of any security system is 
involvement of human security measures; technical measures alone cannot assure the achievement of the 
required level of security. The human factor must be considered and built into the calculation of the 
success of the security system [1]. Individual understanding of and dedication and commitment to 
security from all individuals engaged in related activities will strengthen the security system. 
In such a context, it is widely believed that establishing and promoting a strong security culture is 
essential for building an effective security system. Highlighting its importance and significance, at the 
Nuclear Security Summit of 2014, The Hague Communiqué listed nuclear security culture as the first of 
its three pillars of nuclear security (the other two being physical protection and materials accountancy and 
control) [2].To respond to the need for guidance in  security culture, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) established a model and published an implementation guide for security culture [3].  
The concept of nuclear security culture emerged after that of nuclear safety culture, which was triggered 
in large part by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986. However, both concepts share the 
common objective of protecting society and human lives. As both goals are important for nuclear 
facilities and activities, synergy between them must be enhanced [4, 5]. Many countries with well-
developed nuclear programs, such as China and Japan, have made the enhancement of nuclear security 
culture a top priority [6, 7]. 
 
Indonesia has three research reactors and several supporting nuclear facilities, including nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste treatment facilities, which are operated by the National Nuclear Energy Agency of 
Indonesia (BATAN). The work at these facilities involves the use of nuclear materials. Therefore, as the 
operator of the reactors and facilities and in accordance with national policy, BATAN regards safety and 
security as its top priorities. In Indonesia, all nuclear licensees must include the development of nuclear 
security culture in their security management system [8]. Along with the effort to promote and enhance its 
nuclear security culture, BATAN decided to launch a nuclear security culture self-assessment trial in 
2012 [9, 10]. The trial was conducted with support from the IAEA and the Center for International Trade 
and Security (CITS) at the University of Georgia (UGA). The IAEA security culture assessment guidance 
[11], which was then being drafted, was used as the framework. The objectives included testing the 
process’s draft version and providing feedback to the IAEA regarding the results. The results were also 
expected to: improve understanding of employees’ concerns, needs, aspirations, and motivations; 
illuminate employee opinions about key management issues; and enhance safety culture assessments [9]. 
Based on the experience gained from administering self-assessments in nuclear security culture, Indonesia 
established the Center for Security Culture and Assessment (CSCA) in 2014 in order to administer and 
promote activity in nuclear security culture and assessment under the guidance of BATAN [12]. 
 
While there has been increasing interest in issues regarding nuclear security culture, to date only a few 
countries or institutions have been conducting nuclear security culture self-assessments. In 2014, Bulgaria 
conducted a self-assessment on its nuclear security culture in the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant by using 
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the IAEA methodology. The self-assessment included a survey, an interview, a document review, and an 
observation. A survey form was distributed to 600 employees (or about 15% of the total employee 
population), and an additional twenty (20) employees were interviewed. One of the conclusions from the 
self-assessment was that the methodology not only reveals the areas which need to be improved and the 
overall level of security culture, but also improves security [13]. The Republic of Korea has also 
performed a nuclear security culture survey on the personnel who work at nuclear power plants. The goal 
was to develop a questionnaire used to evaluate the level of awareness of nuclear security issues. The 
survey was not based on the IAEA methodology. The questionnaire covers four categories: beliefs and 
attitudes, operating systems, leadership, and staff behaviors. A total of 858 people were surveyed, and one 
important finding was that awareness increases with age until an employee reaches his or her fifties [14]. 
A preliminary nuclear security culture self-assessment has been conducted in a nuclear instrument 
company in Hungary [15]. The IAEA’s methodology was used, but only the survey was conducted. 
Though the survey was only preliminary, the response from the personnel was positive. The experience 
gained from the activity may be considered in future self-assessment efforts. 
 
Considering the results of Indonesia’s first nuclear security culture assessment and in order to foster 
nuclear security culture, BATAN decided to conduct a second nuclear security culture self-assessment in 
2015 [16]. The objective was primarily to apply all the assessment tools in the IAEA self-assessment 
methodology [17, 18]. In the first assessment, only two of the four assessment tools were used. This 
second assessment was also intended to follow up on the results from the first assessment and to assess 
the performance of security culture in different categories of personnel (subcultures). The subjects of the 
assessment were the multipurpose research reactor, the fuel technology facility, and the radioactive waste 
technology facilities located in the Serpong Nuclear Area. These facilities were chosen because all three 
involve the use of nuclear materials and are located at the same site where the assessment was 
administered. Twelve out of thirty characteristics from the IAEA list of elements of security culture were 
selected based on factors which were considered most important for the implementation of nuclear 
security in BATAN, those which were relatively easy to assess through a questionnaire, and those which 
illuminated findings from the first assessment’s results. Though the basic methodology used was IAEA’s, 
some adjustments were made to adapt to the existing resources and the field circumstances. The self-
assessment was performed by a team consisting primarily of personnel from CSCA/BATAN. 
 
This paper aims to describe the implementation of and general results from the second self-assessment of 
Indonesia’s three nuclear research facilities, as conducted by CSCA/BATAN. The results will be 
presented generically to conform to BATAN’s confidentiality policy. A brief description of the adopted 
IAEA assessment methodology and the assessment’s implementation is provided in Chapter II. The 
significant findings of the assessment and the conclusions are presented in Chapters III and IV, 
respectively. 
II. Methodology and Implementation of Self-Assessment 
A. Methodology 
Per the IAEA’s self-assessment  guidelines [17], there are four methods for obtaining data and 
information regarding the implementation of nuclear security: 
• surveys 
• interviews 
• document reviews 
• observations 
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There are no specific guidelines from the IAEA regarding the sequence of the methods, so the self-
assessment team decided to perform the stages in the abovementioned order (Fig. 1). The last two 
methods were performed simultaneously. The survey is the main data collection technique for 
providing quantitative data. It was used as a basis for the interview and document review stages. 
 
Figure 1.Sequence of implementing the data collection methods. 
The data collected from the survey were analyzed to obtain the average scores for each measured 
characteristic and categorized into positive and negative responses. The negative responses were used by 
the assessment team as the items to be discussed and elaborated on during the interview stage. 
Additionally, some of the positive responses were verified through the document review process. 
 
The survey used a 7-point scale system (see Fig. 2) [17]. Based on the findings of the first self-assessment 
and in order to avoid many responses of “neither agree nor disagree” (a score of 4 on the scale), the 
respondent was asked to include a comment explaining his/her response. Additionally, respondents were 
encouraged to include comments regardless of their responses. The comments served as important context 
for the respondents’ numeric answers. 
 
Figure 2. The scoring system, employing a 7-point scale. 
 
To provide a quantitative figure for each indicator, all scores obtained from the survey were  collected, 
tabulated, and represented in the form of a histogram. The data was analyzed according to each indicator 
and each type of respondent. For each indicator i, the average score, Pav(i), was calculated as follows: 
 
Pav(i)=
∑𝑆𝐷(𝑖) × 1 + ∑𝐷(𝑖) × 2 + ∑𝑆𝑊𝐷(𝑖) × 3 + ∑𝑁𝐴𝐷(𝑖) × 4 + ∑𝑆𝑊𝐴(𝑖) × 5 + ∑𝐴(𝑖) × 6 + ∑𝑆𝐴(𝑖) × 7
∑𝑁𝑅(𝑖)
 (1) 
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where: 
SD : Strongly Disagree 
D : Disagree 
SWD : Somewhat Disagree 
NAD : Neither Agree nor Disagree 
SWA : Somewhat Agree 
A : Agree  
SA : Strongly Agree 
NR : Number of Respondents  
 
The average score for each characteristic c, Pav(c), and of all the indicators assessed, Pav, are then 
given by: 
Pav(c)=
∑𝑃𝑎𝑣(𝑖)
∑𝑁𝐼 (𝑐)
 (2) 
 
And 
 
Pav=
∑𝑃𝑎𝑣(𝑖)
∑𝑁𝐼
 (3) 
 
where NI(c) and NI are the number of indicators in characteristic c and total number of indicators, 
respectively; Pav(i) in (2) is the sum of the average score of all indicators in characteristic c; and Pav(i) 
is the sum of the average scores of all indicators. 
 
Figure 3(a) shows an example of a histogram of the survey results for one indicator. The figure illustrates 
the average score, Pav (shown by dashed line), and the average score of the indicator, Pav(i) (shown by a 
small triangle). A response was categorized as a negative response when the average score of the 
indicator (Pav(i)) was somewhat lower than the average point Pav, and as a positive response when Pav(i) 
was higher than the average point Pav. 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3. (a) Survey results in the form of a histogram, and (b) Conflicted view. 
There is a possibility that some responses indicated conflicted views. Such conflicted views represent 
divided opinions among the respondents; the majority of the views are favorable to the survey statement, 
but unfavorable views are also considerable, as shown in Fig. 3(b).  Results of this kind need to be 
explored further in order to discover the cause. Moreover, based on the color zones as specified in the 
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IAEA guidelines (explicated herein), the average score for an indicator below 4 should be in the red zone, 
between 4 and 5 falls in the yellow zone, and scores higher than 5 should be in the green zone [17]. 
Data collected from all methods were then consolidated. The analysis of the data provided quantitative 
findings (from the survey stage) and qualitative findings (from the interview, the document assessment, 
and the observation stages) concerning the security culture characteristics being assessed. The results of 
the consolidated assessment data were then plotted in a diagram composed of three zones—i.e., red, 
yellow, and green—indicating regions of weakness (serious problems), gaps needing to be dealt with, and 
strengths (areas of good performance), respectively. 
B. Implementation 
Respondents 
 
About 60% of employees from three nuclear research centers were expected to be involved in the self-
assessment, particularly for the survey and interview stages. The respondents could be classified into 
three subcultures: structural personnel, non-structural personnel, and security personnel. Structural 
personnel are ones in charge in an organizational structure (i.e., management), non-structural personnel 
are researchers or administrative employees, and security personnel are guards and physical protection 
employees. 
 
Characteristics and Indicators Assessed 
 
The IAEA model of security culture consists of three layers: belief and attitudes, principles and 
management systems, and behaviors of leadership and personnel [3]. The management systems and 
behaviors are identified the observable elements, also called “artifacts,” which could be gathered directly 
based on the self-assessment. Each element comprises several characteristics. In total, there are 30 
characteristics. The IAEA guidelines assign cultural indicators to the characteristics of nuclear security 
culture, which can be used to evaluate the characteristics’ performance. 
 
Thirty indicators have been defined which represent twelve major characteristics in three elements of the 
nuclear security culture model—i.e., the management system, leadership behaviors, and personnel 
behaviors. Each indicator was converted to a personalized question (or survey statement) for the survey. 
The twelve characteristics and the number of associated indicators used for each characteristic are shown 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The elements, characteristics, and number of indicators used in the assessment. 
No. Element of 
Security Culture 
Characteristics Number of Indicators 
(survey statements) 
1. Management System Clear role and responsibility 
Performance measurement 
Training and qualification 
Quality assurance 
Self-assessment 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2. Leadership Behavior Use of authority 
Effective communication 
Motivation 
3 
3 
3 
3. Personnel Behavior Professional conduct 
Personal accountability 
Adherence to procedures 
Vigilance 
3 
3 
3 
1 
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Surveys 
Prior to conducting the survey, a validation of its questions was performed to check that they were easy to 
understand. For this step, 25 respondents were invited to participate. The check concluded that the survey 
could easily be understood. 
 
The total number of respondents for the survey, or the target response rate, was expected to be about 60% 
of the three facilities’ total employees—i.e., about 315 people. As described above, the respondents were 
classified as structural, non-structural, and security personnel. There were thirty (30) total statements on 
the survey. Given that number, a total of 8,310 responses were expected to be collected. 
 
In actuality, the total number of survey respondents was 277 people, or about 52% of the total employees 
of the three facilities. This deficit resulted from other urgent activities that prevented some employees 
from participating on the day of the survey. Based on the category (or subculture) of the respondents, the 
numbers of security personnel, structural respondents, and non-structural respondents were 36 (about 
13%), 43 (about 15.5%), and 198 (about 71.5%), respectively. The survey was implemented on one day in 
three batches. All respondents were given a short introduction on the objective of the self-assessment and 
instructions on how to respond to the survey prior to its implementation. The time allocated for each batch 
of the survey was about 60 minutes. This time was considered adequate based on the previous self-
assessment. 
 
Interviews 
 
Forty-five employees from the three facilities were invited to participate in the interview stage of the 
assessment. Half of interviewees participated in the survey. They also represented the three subcultures. 
There were two interviewers and 60 minutes allotted for each interviewee. None of the interviewers were 
from the security personnel subculture. The technique used for the interview was a semi-structured 
session developed from the survey and written comments. The guidelines for the interview were prepared 
in advance by the self-assessment team. The interview was focused on the elaboration of so-called 
negative responses obtained from the survey results, as they appeared in the histograms. 
 
Document Reviews 
 
Document reviews were done to determine whether the documents relating to security management had 
been well-managed or not, and to re-check certain positive responses obtained from the survey. Many 
documents assessed were classified as confidential, so the assessment was performed at each individual 
site, and all assessors agreed regarding the assessment’s confidentiality. Considering the number of 
documents and time allocated, the number of assessors at each site was about nine or ten people. 
 
Observations 
 
The assessment’s observations were intended to observe and record actual performance in the field in real 
time, and they would be compared to the results of the survey. The observations were done during the 
joint training exercise session conducted in the Serpong Nuclear Research Area, where the three centers 
being assessed are located. They were conducted by an unseen observer team. 
III. Results and Discussion 
The second nuclear security culture self-assessment was administered somewhat more successfully than 
the first self-assessment trial of 2012-2013, particularly with respect to the following three areas: (1) the 
utilization of the four data collection methods, (2)  the involvement of the team members with a greater 
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variety of backgrounds (a multidisciplinary approach), and (3) the use of personalized questions/survey 
statements and validation of survey statements prior to its administration. All four assessment tools were 
carried out efficiently. However, the quantitative results from the survey was used as the primary data for 
the overall assessment, while the results from interview, document review, and observation stages were 
more frequently used as supplementary data. 
 
The collected responses on the survey were nearly 99%. This figure means that not all respondents 
responded to all 30 survey statements. One hundred and twenty-two (122) written responses were 
received, a figure markedly higher than the thirty-five (35) written responses from the first self-
assessment. Some comments were general in nature, such as those relating to management issues, and 
these were not precisely related to security matters. The increase in collected comments represents some 
of the best improvements gained from this second self-assessment. These comments are valuable for the 
interpretation of the survey results and also for the consideration during the interview process. 
 
After collecting all response data, the histogram of each indicator was drawn up and the average score of 
each indicator, Pav(i), and each characteristic, Pav(c), was calculated using Eq. (1) and (2). Figure 4 
shows examples of histograms for two survey statements. The average score of each characteristic, 
Pav(c), ranges from 4.60 to 5.67, and the overall average score, Pav, is 5.25. 
  
Figure 4. Examples of histograms of two survey statements. 
Fig. 5 depicts the average score of each characteristic. The dashed vertical line is the average score Pav. 
The average score of each indicator is placed in the green zone if the score is higher than 5, in the yellow 
zone if the score is between 4 and 5, and in the red zone if the score is lower than 4. As shown in Fig. 4, 
no characteristic is in red zone; only one characteristic, motivation, is in the yellow zone; and all others 
are in the green zone. These results indicate that the survey respondents viewed most of the assessed 
characteristics of security culture favorably. 
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Figure 5. The average score of each characteristics. 
Regarding the characteristic of motivation, three indicators were examined through the following three 
survey statements: 
1. My managers recognize commendable attitudes and behaviors (statement #7) 
2. My facility has reward systems recognizing staff members’ contributions towards maintaining 
nuclear security (statement #8) 
3. I am aware of the systems of rewards and sanctions relating to nuclear security (statement #9) 
 
Based on the collected survey scores, the responses for statements #8 and #9 are categorized as negative 
responses and conflicted views. Later, during the interview, these responses were  elaborated on. Most 
interviewees thought that there was no clear reward system relating to  security issues. In this regard, it is 
interesting that some interviewees defined the reward as being strictly limited to acknowledgment of the 
employee’s important contribution. Further analysis found that there is a correlation between the 
characteristic of motivation and other leadership characteristics being assessed, e.g., the use of authority 
and communication. The responses for these last two characteristics also demonstrated some conflicting 
views, including survey statement #1, “My superior reserves time to provide direct guidance (on nuclear 
security).” The survey results on this statement showed conflicting views. About 18% of the responses 
fell between “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree.” The interviews revealed that the respondents 
had expected their superiors/managers to give more time to talk about security, and to guide and direct 
employees about the security matters. Concerning the motivation of personnel, results from the survey 
conducted in other studies in nuclear power plants indicate similar findings. It has been found that 
respondents are generally discontented with their management for not motivating personnel [14]. The role 
of the managers is also important for enhancing adherence to procedures by, for example, closely 
monitoring, evaluating, and providing exemplary behavior in implementing good practices in adhering to 
procedures. Or, the organization could consider two policy strategies regarding the adherence to rules and 
procedures, which are based in command-and-control models and self-regulatory approaches [19]. 
 
The survey also uncovered is that compared to the other elements of security culture, a comparatively 
large number of indicators of leadership behavior being assessed yielded  negative responses and 
conflicting views in their categories. The responses indicated that respondents have a higher level of 
concern about these leadership behaviors. This may also be result of Indonesian cultural views of 
leadership, which are based on paternalistic leadership practices combined with elements of visible 
leadership as its most dominant factors [20]. 
9
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From the survey results, it is possible to study any differences in views of the respondents  from the three 
different nuclear research facilities and the three different subcultures. Figure 6 depicts the results of the 
average scores of the twelve characteristics for the three nuclear research facilities. It shows that, despite 
some differences in the results from center two, the results for all three facilities are, on average, almost 
identical. In other words, there is no significant difference in views with regard to the employees’ nuclear 
security culture, regardless of the employees’ place of work. 
 
 
Figure 6. Scores of twelve characteristics surveyed for three facilities. 
Concerning the different subcultures’ views on security culture, Fig. 7 shows the average scores of twelve 
characteristics for the three different subcultures obtained from the survey. It is interesting to note that in 
Fig. 7, the pattern of responses from all subcultures are quite similar to one another. In general, the non-
structural subcultures scored lower in all indicators than the security personnel and the structural 
subcultures. It should be noted that the number of survey participants from the non-structural category 
was higher than the security and the structural categories. When this is cross-checked with the interview 
results, it is possible that the difference in responses may result from the fact that some non-structural 
category respondents do not understand the security concepts well. Some thought that security is simply 
the responsibility of guards. On the other hand, it should be noted that the number of non-structural 
respondents was higher than the number of respondents from the security personnel and structural 
personnel, comprising 71.5% of those surveyed. It is also known that many of this 71.5% were never 
previously exposed to the dissemination of nuclear security information. This finding provides a warning 
to the management that there should be improvements and enhancements made to the effectiveness of the 
dissemination of security policy and security culture programs, especially to researchers and 
administrative personnel. 
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Figure 7. Score of twelve characteristics surveyed for three different subcultures. 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
From implementing the self-assessment according to the IAEA methodology, there are several lessons 
that could be learned by both the self-assessment team and the organization, which include: 
1. Though surveys and interviews are considered the primary techniques for collecting data for self-
assessments, the document reviews and observations were useful for enriching the data and 
enhancing the analysis. Observations should be done over a greater period of time, rather than 
exclusively during the drill session, as was done in the current assessment, and should focus on 
predetermined aspects of security culture. 
 
2. The validation of survey statements prior to the survey implementation was found to be very 
helpful for avoiding misunderstandings about the survey statement. Moreover, the use of 
personalized question types of survey statements helped the respondents to understand the survey 
statements. The team also realized that some survey statements are quite similar to each other. So, 
in the future, the survey statements should explore a greater variety of aspects of each determined 
characteristic. 
 
3. The request for respondents to provide a written comment if their response falls on a 4 on the 7-
point scale helped to prevent the respondents from responding “Neither Agree nor Disagree.” As 
well, this practice increases the number of comments received. 
 
4. The interviewer’s skills are crucial, especially when trying to make the interviewee feel more 
comfortable and be more open in his/her answers. Interviewees should not feel intimidated. By 
helping the interviewees feel relaxed, interviewers were able to uncover more information from 
the interviewees. This practice is important because some interviewees seemed less open in 
answering specific questions. The team should consider organizing a training session on 
interviewer skills. 
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5. The development of consolidated results is a critical step that requires in-depth knowledge and 
analysis. From this present assessment, the implementation was found to be needing 
improvement. 
 
6. The involvement of high-level management in the self-assessment was appreciated and increased 
the motivation of personnel involved in the self-assessment (i.e., the self-assessment team and 
respondents). 
IV. Conclusion 
The second self-assessment on nuclear security culture in three nuclear research facilities in Indonesia 
using the IAEA methodology has been successfully performed. All four data collection techniques 
recommended in the IAEA methodology were used, though the surveys and interviews were still the most 
important data sources for the assessment. The implementation of the self-assessment has also provided 
meaningful information to the organization in terms of illustrating the present status of the nuclear 
security culture and the security culture characteristics which need to be improved. From the twelve 
characteristics of the three security culture elements assessed, it was found that, in general, there are 
already good practices and strong elements in place. However, some indicators need to be improved. The 
most important one is the motivation characteristics. To that end, the management should also consider 
enhancing the dissemination of nuclear security concepts and policies to the researchers and 
administrative personnel. 
 
The implementation of the second self-assessment was a marked improvement over the first assessment. 
However, some items require further improvement, such as the formulation of survey statements, in 
determining the indicators to be explored in the interview, and more in-depth observations. The skill of 
the interviewers in guiding the interviewees should also be improved. The experience gained from this 
second self-assessment is very important to prepare for self-assessments at other facilities involving 
radioactive materials. 
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